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Abstract 
 
The starting-point of the article is the inconsistency between the established practice 
of acceptance in many cases, of economic policy (i.e. progressive taxation, national 
insurance policies) and the theoretical rejection of interpersonal comparisons of utility 
who see it as an unscientific value judgement. The inconsistency is explained by 
identifying three groups of theorists: (1) those who thought of comparability as a 
value judgement and unacceptable for economic policy considerations (positivists), 
(2) those who agreed with the positivists, on the normative nature of comparability 
but accepted it as a basis for economic policy, and (3) those who thought of it as part 
of a scientific economics. The implication was that, despite the dominance of 
positivist methodology in other sub-fields, the historical experience points to the 
difficulty of applying positivist methodology to the issue of comparability. If the 
inconsistency is thus due to the inappropriateness of the positivist approach, the only 
possible solution is the explicit abandonment of this approach at least in matters 
related to the collective aspects of economics. 
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Introduction 
 
The issue of interpersonal comparisons of utility is about the possibility (or not) 
of comparing the utility or welfare or the mental states in general of different 
individuals. Before we go on, it would be useful to mention that a number of 
economists have used different terms from that of utility. Some of the terms that 
have been used are: ophelimity, happiness, satisfaction, pleasure, economic welfare, 
enjoyment. All of these terms were conceived as subjective sensations. Thus by 
the concept of interpersonal comparisons we will mean the comparison of subjective 
sensations in general (for the use of other concepts and their relationship to utility, 
see Wicksteed, 1933, pp. 417-18; Pareto, 1971, p. 112; Pigou, 1951, p. 289, and 
Tarascio, 1979, p. 411). It can be maintained that interpersonal comparison is an 
important problem in economics. Its importance can be realised from the fact that 
almost every major economist in the history of economics has devoted some space 
to the discussion of the issue. In the last 70 years, the discussion of comparability 
has intensified and has become more controversial. The controversy was centred 
on the possibilities or impossibility of interpersonal comparisons. Although there 
is still evidence of the continuation of the discussion, one can state that the majority 
of economists are prepared to declare that interpersonal comparisons are not 
possible. As Sen points out: "the use of interpersonal comparisons is widely 
thought to be arbitrary, and many people view these comparisons as meaningless" 
(Sen, 1970, p. 4). Or as one can read in the influential Henderson and Quandt's 
Microeconomic Theory: 
 
Welfare comparisons would be simple if it were possible to aggregate the utilities of 
individuals into a single function. Unfortunately, this operation cannot be performed. 
Interpersonal comparisons of utility are not possible (Henderson and Quandt, 1971, p. 255). 
 
Most of the economists who rejected comparability rejected it on the basis that 
it is a value judgement. This idea is a product of the influence of positivist scientific 
philosophies in economics. In particular, Robbins was the one who promoted it 
in the modern period, and thus influenced the views of contemporary economists. 
However, despite' this explicit rejection of comparability by the majority of 
economists, interpersonal comparisons are implicitly assumed in many cases. 
 
A few indicative examples will clarify the above. First, the welfare concept of real 
national income, which is so popular among economists and social scientists in 
general, presupposes comparability. (It must be mentioned that the productive 
capacity concept does not require comparability.) Usher has pointed out that the 
welfare-based concept of real income which is widely used involves interpersonal 
comparisons of utility (Usher, 1980, pp. 57-61). One might also note that the 
significance of national income as a welfare indicator among different countries 
requires some means of aggregating individual welfare which in turn implies 
comparability. Secondly, the theoretical justification of the system of progressive 
taxation rests on the assumption that comparability is possible. 
 
Apart from the above theoretical cases, interpersonal comparisons are also 
assumed in a significant number of policy measures. For instance, the national 
insurance systems of many countries tend to favour certain parts of the population. 
Again this implies comparability. In addition, the adoption of progressive taxation 
by a large number of countries is further evidence of acceptance of comparability 
in matters of economic and social policy. 
 
The contemporary dominant view of the impossibility of comparability and the 
above mentioned examples present a serious inconsistency. The roots of this 
inconsistency can be traced back into the history of ideas of major economists 
about comparability. One can distinguish two streams of thought: the utilitarian 
oriented economists with a belief in comparability and cardinal measurability of 
utility, and the advocates of positive economics who deny comparability and favour 
ordinal utility. The fact that the majority of contemporary economists reject 
comparability indicates that the winners of this long controversy were the positivists. 
However, the implicit acceptance of comparability, as discussed above, signifies 
that the utilitarian oriented economists had their influence too. 
 
In this article, an attempt will be made to explain this inconsistency by discussing 
the emergence and the development of the above broadly defined two streams 
of economic thought. Moreover, the evolution of policy measures which require 
comparability will be discussed, and an attempt to connect it with the theoretical 
developments will be made. In addition, the more recent discussions of the issue 
of comparability, especially in the context of welfare economics will be examined. 
 
Bentham and Mill 
 
The origin of utilitarianism can be found in the ideas of Bentham. The cornerstone 
of Bentham's system was the "Greatest Happiness Principle", which sets 
the moral standard for the individual and for the community. In Bentham's words: 
' 'It is the greatest happiness of the greatest number that is the measure of right 
and wrong" (Bentham, 1969, p. 45). This principle inevitably demands that utility 
be measurable and Bentham attempted to measure it according to its duration, 
intensity, certainty, etc. (Bentham, 1969, pp. 96-7). For Bentham, the community's 
total utility is the sum of individual utilities, and his ideal is the collective 
maximisation of happiness which clearly implies the possibility of comparability. 
In his other major work, Theory of Legislation, the acceptance of comparability 
is more explicit. Two propositions are stated: (a) "of two individuals with unequal 
fortunes, he who has the more wealth has the more happiness"; (b) "the excess 
happiness of the richer will not be so great as the excess of his wealth" (Bentham, 
1882, p. 103). Proposition (a) compares feelings among individuals and proposition 
(b) implies both diminishing marginal utility for each individual and similar capacities 
for satisfaction. These two last ideas are also basic for subsequent utilitarian 
economists. Moreover, Bentham's justification of proposition (a) provides an 
additional explicit acceptance of comparability. As he writes, "a king's happiness 
would be greater than the average happiness of a thousand farmers" (Bentham, 
1882, pp. 104-5). 
 
In general the very nature of Bentham's system involves comparability. It is 
a key concept for the application and the logical coherence of his philosophy. 
Utilitarianism started as mainly a social philosophy. Social objectives and questions 
play a central role. Along with comparability, measurability of utility is also 
important. However, Bentham accepted comparability without giving adequate 
justification. It seems that he considered it as obvious to everyone. As we shall 
see, the subsequent economists who accepted comparability and cardinal 
measurability belong to the utilitarian tradition. Utilitarianism and comparability 
of utility are vitally connected. 
 
Mill was the first major classical economist to be influenced by Bentham. 
Following Bentham, Mill emphasises the importance of the Greatest Happiness 
Principle as a universal moral standard. Mill stresses that the principle refers to 
the maximisation of happiness of the society not of the individual: "[It] is not 
the agent's own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness 
altogether" (Mill, 1979, p. 262). His emphasis on the collective maximisation of 
happiness implies his conviction that the community's total utility is the sum of 
individual utilities which in turn involves comparability. Again, like Bentham, he 
believed in the measurability of pleasure or utility (Mill, 1979, pp. 262-4). 
In addition, Mill makes explicit interpersonal comparisons in his discussion of 
the Greatest Happiness Principle. 
That principle [Greatest Happiness Principle] is a mere form of words without rational 
signification, unless one person's happiness, supposed equal in degree (with the proper 
allowance made for kind) is counted for exactly as much as another (Mill, 1979, p. 319). 
 
It can be said that the above passage signifies the essence of Mill's utilitarianism: 
apart from comparability, equal capacity for pleasure for every individual is also 
accepted. The emphasis by Mill on the second idea can be attributed to his being 
a liberal utilitarian. Collective maximisation and equal value to everybody are 
essential in his thought. 
 
Thus, with Bentham and Mill, the utilitarian tradition in-economics starts to 
take shape. In short, utilitarianism put much emphasis on social questions and 
its solution to these questions, collective maximisation of happiness, inevitably 
involved the certainty of making interpersonal comparisons. 
 
Marginalist School 
 
As observed above, comparability is an issue which arises in theories which mostly 
deal with social questions (utilitarianism). The first three founders of the Marginalist 
School do not mention much about the issue. Their relative indifference towards 
comparability can be explained by their tendency to be interested mainly in analysing 
microeconomic phenomena. This is why we find explicit reference to comparability in 
only one of the three founders of marginalism. More specifically, only Jevons refers 
to it in his Theory of Political Economy and he rejects it. His justification for the 
rejection was based not so much on positivist grounds (although positive elements can 
be found in his work) as would be the case with subsequent economists, but on the 
difficulty of finding any means for making interpersonal comparisons (Jevons, 1871, 
p. 21). It seems that the Austrian, Menger, the least marginalist of the three, wanted to 
avoid discussing the subject. A possible explanation for this can be his emphasis on 
subjectivity. It would be difficult to expect Menger to hold that an independent 
observer can compare the individual (subjective) utilities of different persons. In 
addition, Menger's position can be related to the reluctance of the Austrian economists 
to make predictions of other people's behaviour. In general, Austrian economists are 
not interested in welfare economics. Walras also avoided the issue although he made 
some incidental interpersonal comparisons (Stigler, 1950, p. 318). We believe that his 
preference towards microeconomic study was a central reason for the above 
avoidance 
 
However, one can find explicit reference to comparability in the works of 
economists of the second marginalist generation (end of 19th/beginning of 20th 
centuries) who were more inclined towards social questions in economics. In 
addition, the second generation further developed the theory of utility and one 
of the consequences of this development was the more systematic discussion of 
the problem of interpersonal comparisons. Apart from those two factors, another 
important reason for the interest in the issue of comparability was the first steps 
by national governments towards legislating income taxation. In particular, in the 
latter half of the 19th century the UK and US governments made the first moves 
towards establishing income taxation. Thus, the need for the theoretical justification 
of progressive taxation added to interest in comparability because without 
comparability progressive taxation cannot be justified theoretically. Moreover, the 
influence of the utilitarian thought (the Greatest Happiness Principle) on the 
emergence of the above measures must be taken into account. 
 
Marshall 
In contrast with the founders of marginalism, Marshall showed a considerable 
interest in social questions and matters of economic policy. Thus, in his work 
Marshall refers to the problem of comparability explicitly. First of all, in many parts 
and appendices of his Principles of Economics utility is treated as a cardinal concept 
(Marshall, 1961, pp. 93, 838). This cardinality facilitates the acceptance of 
comparability which Marshall was eager to endorse in the first editions of his 
Principles. In the subsequent editions (especially in the ninth) he was less eager 
but still convinced. Thus, one can read the following indicative passage in the last 
edition: 
[ T]he real worth of a thing might be discussed with reference not to a single person but to 
people in general, and thus it would naturally be assumed that a shilling's worth of 
gratification to one Englishman might be taken as equivalent with a shilling's worth to 
another, "to start with "and "until cause to the contrary were shown": but everyone would 
know that this was a reasonable course only on the supposition that the consumers of tea and 
those of salt belonged to the same classes of people, and involved people at every variety of 
temperament. This involves the consideration that a pound's worth of satisfaction to an 
ordinary poor man is a much greater thing than a pound's worth of satisfaction to an ordinary 
rich man (Marshall, 1961, p. 130). 
 
It can be observed that for Marshall comparability is possible only when people 
belong to the same class. The same idea can be found in subsequent economists 
who discuss comparability. Moreover, Marshall's statement, that a pound has a 
greater utility (or gives more satisfaction) to the poor man than it gives to the 
rich man, was to become the basis for the theoretical justification of progressive 
taxation. Marshall's acceptance of comparability was in line with his cardinal 
conception of utility and also with his willingness to discuss the solutions of social 
issues through economics. Thus, as far as the issue of comparability is concerned, 
Marshall's ideas belong to the utilitarian framework. 
 
Edgeworth 
 
Edgeworth's economic thought was probably much closer to utilitarianism than 
Marshall's. The calculus of pleasure and pain is the basis of economics for 
Edgeworth. More specifically, he distinguishes between economical and utilitarian 
or moral calculus. The economical calculus "investigates the equilibrium of a system 
of hedonic forces each tending to maximum individual utility"; while the utilitarian 
calculus investigates "the equilibrium of a system in which each and all tend to 
maximum universal utility" (Edgeworth, 1881, p. 15). Although he recognises some 
difficulties in the measurability of utility or pleasure, Edgeworth proceeds to invent 
a unit which measures pleasure. This unit which has two dimensions, time and 
intensity, is adequate for economical calculus. However: 
For moral calculus a further dimension is required; to compare the happiness of one person 
with the happiness of another, and generally the happiness of groups of different members 
and different average happiness (Edgeworth 1881, p. 7). 
 
Edgeworth's utilitarian or moral calculus is close to the contemporary idea of the 
maximisation of social welfare and, by pointing out the need for comparability in 
this issue, he follows the utilitarian tradition. Moreover, he is prepared to justify 
theoretically his belief in comparability. As he writes: 
Such comparisons can no longer be shirked if there is to be any systematic morality at all. It 
is postulated by distributive justice. It is postulated by the population question (Edgeworth, 
1881, p. 8). 
 
However, contrary to the utilitarian framework — and especially to Bentham and 
Mill — Edgeworth does not accept equal capacities for satisfaction. He holds that 
some people have greater capacity for happiness than others (Edgeworth, 1881, 
p. 57). Edgeworth's departure at this point prevents him from concluding that equal 
distribution leads to an increase of total welfare (even if he admits — as he does— 
diminishing marginal utility of income). Also this is the main reason for his 
rejection of the idea of progressive taxation (see also Creedy, 1981, pp. 89-91). 
However, in his later work, Papers Relating to Political Economy, he finds 
comparability necessary for establishing a theory of taxation. 
Practically, I think, in order to apply A2 — to show for instance that the richer class should 
contribute a larger sum of money (I do not say a larger proportion of income) — we must 
presuppose the sympathetic comparison of wants and feelings experienced by different 
persons. (Edgeworth, 1925, p. 235). 
 
Thus, Edgeworth reinforced the utilitarian idea that problems of social welfare 
involve interpersonal comparisons. Moreover, he was one of the first economists 
to draw attention to the issue of taxation and to state explicitly that comparability 
is needed for its solution. 
 
Pareto 
It can be maintained that Pareto's ideas on comparability mark the emergence 
of the positivist approach. More specifically, Pareto's ideas were the representative 
example of the application of positivist thought in economics. As a positivist, he 
advocated the rejection of all metaphysical or ethical concepts from social sciences 
(especially from Economics and Sociology). Thus, not without justification, a great 
number of contemporary welfare economists consider Pareto to be the founder 
of positive welfare economics. The main reasons for this were first Pareto's attempt 
to get away from the controversial notion of the cardinal measurability of utility 
and to replace it with the concept of ordinal preference; and, secondly, Pareto's 
endeavour to find a social optimum position without the necessity of comparing 
the satisfactions of different persons. Pareto's indices of ophelimity set the basis 
for the subsequent theory of choice which claims to be independent of any 
subjective concepts and assumptions. (For a discussion of the concept of ophelimity 
and its relationship with utility, see Hutchinson, 1960, p. 220; and Cooter and 
Rappoport, 1984, p. 515.) However, from our point of view the key here is his 
idea that interpersonal comparisons of utilities or ophelimities have no scientific 
basis: 
The ophelimity, or its index, for one individual, and the ophelimity, or its index, for another 
individual, are heterogeneous quantities, We can neither add them together nor compare them. 
No bridge, as the English say. A sum of ophelimity enjoyed by different individuals does not 
exist; it is an expression which has no meaning (Pareto, 1971, p. 172). 
 
The assertion that comparability is meaningless can be found in subsequent 
positivist oriented economists who would see it as the main justification for the 
rejection of interpersonal comparisons 
 
However, it must be noted that Pareto is not very strict in following his rejection 
of comparability. In some parts of his work he seems to be tolerant of the idea. 
More specifically, in his Cours d'Economie Politique he is prepared to admit 
comparison of utilities — he uses it as a more general term — among peoples: 
"If we admit, as it is done generally enough, that utility, for a people, is mixed 
with the material prospering and the moral and intellectual development, we have 
a criterion to establish comparisons among different peoples" (Pareto, 1896, p. 
51). In his Manual he is more specific. He states that there are two classes of 
theories. Intrapersonal comparisons belong to the first class; interpersonal 
comparisons to the second class. According to him the study of the theories of 
the second class is the most unsatisfactory in social science (Pareto, 1971, p. 106). 
However, he realises the need for theories of the second class (comparability) in his 
discussion of equilibrium in a collectivist society especially in the problem 
of distribution. In order to proceed in his discussion, Pareto assumes that the 
problem of comparability is solved (Pareto, 1971, p. 267). The important point here 
is that, although he denies comparability in principle, he is prepared to accept 
it in matters of collective welfare. Thus we can state that in the second generation 
of the marginalist school, the utilitarian tradition continues in the ideas of Marshall 
and Edgeworth about comparability. However, with Pareto, we have the systematic 
introduction of the positivist approach towards the issue which was to become 
so influential in the subsequent discussion (see Aron, 1967, p. 145). Before closing 
this section, it is useful to mention that Wicksell and Fisher, who also belong to 
the second marginalist generation, pointed to the need for comparability in social 
questions (Wicksell, 1961, p. 76 and Fisher, 1927, p. 159). 
 
Post-marginalist Developments 
 
Utilitarian Welfare Economics 
In the previous section it was observed that economists of the second generation 
of the marginalist school emphasised explicitly that interpersonal comparisons were 
necessary for problems related to aggregate welfare. During the first decades of 
the 20th century, there was a considerable increase of interest in these problems 
of social welfare. Moreover, during the same period, there was the legislation 
for progressive taxation by UK and USA which added further interest in the issue 
of comparability (Blum and Kalven, 1953, p. 12). Also, the National Insurance Act 
of 1911 can be seen in the above perspective. 
 
The result of this increased interest in social welfare was the emergence of 
a separate field of economics: welfare economics, with the publication of Pigou's 
book, Wealth and Welfare, in 1911. Naturally, the requirement of comparability 
was one of the bases for the new sub-field. Pigou followed the strict utilitarian 
approach and he made interpersonal comparisons: 
Nevertheless it is evident that any transference of income from a relatively rich man to a 
relatively poor man of similar temperament, since it enables more intense wants to be 
satisfied at the expense of less intense wants, must increase the aggregate sum of satisfaction 
(Pigou, 1939, p. 87). 
 
The idea of "similar temperament" is very close to Marshall's and Fisher's views. 
Moreover, Pigou's statement that equal distribution increases welfare is valid here 
only when one assumes (apart from comparability) measurability of utility, 
diminishing marginal utility and equal capacities for satisfaction. Pigou thought of 
the above as factual assumptions. This statement is in accordance with the views 
of Bentham, Mill and Marshall. Pigou himself realises the implicit assumptions 
of his statement when he writes: 
The old "law of diminishing utility" thus leads securely to the proposition: "Any cause which 
increases the absolute share of real income in the hands of the poor, provided that it does not 
lead to a contraction of the national dividend from any point of view, will in general increase 
economic welfare" (Pigou, 1932, p. 87). 
 
In general, Pigou, like Bentham, conceives of social welfare as the sum of individual 
welfares and thus, as we have seen, implies the comparability of utilities or welfare 
of different individuals. Pigou uses the concept of economic welfare which is very 
similar to the concept of satisfaction (see Pigou, 1951, p. 288). However, it must 
be noted that, in spite of his acceptance of comparability, Pigou had reservations 
about the accuracy of interpersonal comparisons. It seems that comparability was 
one of his still empty economic boxes. 
 
Harrod's ideas about comparability belong to the Pigovian tradition. In his 
presidential address before Section F of the British Association (1938), Harrod 
agreed with Pigou about comparability. Moreover, like Pigou, he accepted the 
diminishing marginal utility of income and the equality of capacities for satisfaction. 
 
The further postulate that the two pence has lower utility to a millionaire than the £25 p.a. 
man is based on some sort of assumption about equality of men in regard to their needs which 
must not be pressed too far. But so also do the prescriptions favourable to free markets. For 
the individuals who gain by the opening of a market are often different from those who suffer 
some loss. Consider the Repeal of the Corn Laws. This tended to reduce the value of a 
specific factor of production — land. It can no doubt be shown that the gain to the community 
as a whole exceeded the loss to the landlords — but only if individuals are treated in some 
sense as equal (Harrod, 1938, p. 396). 
 
Harrod's example of an increase of the social gain with the Repeal of the Corn 
Laws presupposes comparability of utilities. Finally, Harrod — like most of the 
economists that were discussed in the previous pages — finds comparability 
absolutely necessary for welfare questions and generally for welfare economists 
(Harrod, 1938, p. 397). 
 
Thus, it can be maintained that the utilitarian tradition, which continued in the 
welfare economics of Pigou and Harrod, was dominant in the first decades of this 
century. The theoretical acceptance of interpersonal comparisons was matched 
with economic and social policy developments like the adoption of progressive 
taxation and of national insurance: developments which clearly presupposed 
comparability. 
 
 
The Growth of Positivist Framework 
 
Logical Positivism was a scientific philosophy which emerged at the beginning of 
this century. Its basis can be found in 19th century positivism. The fundamental 
point of this system was that a statement, which cannot be verified or which is 
not a tautology, is meaningless. In particular, these meaningless statements are 
branded "value judgements". As one of the founders of logical positivism put it: 
"Value judgements have no theoretical sense. Therefore we assign them to the 
realm of metaphysics" (Carnap, 1981, p. 150). The influence of logical positivism 
on economics was considerable. Although Robbins cannot be branded a logical 
positivist, he was one of the first economists to be influenced by this philosophical 
movement. Robbins represented the introduction of the spirit of logical positivism 
in economics which rejected any non-verifiable (non-scientific) element in social 
sciences. Robbins' thought was in a way connected with the earlier positivist ideas 
of Pareto discussed above. 
 
The implications of the spirit of logical positivism for the issue of comparability 
and for welfare economics in general were very important. More analytically, the 
most important argument against comparability was that it was conceived as a 
value judgement and thus meaningless. Thus, comparability was rejected as a non-
scientific statement. In Robbins' words: 
I still cannot believe that it is helpful to speak as if interpersonal comparisons of utility rest 
upon scientific foundations — that is, upon observation and introspection (Robbins, 1938, p. 
640). 
 
Robbins' assertion that introspection is a legitimate scientific method is very 
interesting because it has two important implications. The first one which is crucial 
for comparability is that introspection might be seen as a potential basis for 
interpersonal comparisons. The second one is the problematic character of 
intersubjective agreement about economic data once introspection is accepted. 
Moreover, apart from the above, Hutchison has pointed out the logical contradiction 
between adopting intrapersonal comparisons of utility as a legitimate basis of the 
theory of consumer behaviour and at the same time rejecting comparability as 
a basis of welfare economics (see Hutchison, 1965, p. 138). Robbins' rejection 
of comparability as a value judgement was to have substantial influence on 
subsequent economists. Robbins also rejected the idea of equal capacities for 
satisfaction on the same grounds. Before we proceed, it has to be mentioned that, 
although Robbins rejected comparability in principle, he was ready to accept it 
in matters of economic policy so long as its normative character was stated explicitly 
(see Robbins, 1938, pp. 640-1). 
 
Robbins' rejection of comparability is also connected with his views about the 
measurability of utility. More specifically, during this period the established view 
of a cardinally measurable utility started to be challenged by the idea of ordinal 
utility. As we have seen, all the previous economists (with the exception of Pareto) 
thought of utility as cardinally measurable. The impact of logical positivism was 
again present in the theory of ordinal utility. In particular, the ambiguity of the 
utility concept and even more the ambiguity of a cardinal utility concept led positivist 
oriented economists to the invention of ordinal utility (see Hicks and Allen, 1934). 
The important point here is that cardinal utility facilitates interpersonal comparisons 
and thus, with its rejection, the theoretical justification of comparability weakened 
to a great extent. 
 
Finally, Robbins' statement in his earlier and very influential work, An Essay 
of the Nature and Significance of Economic Science, that comparability cannot be 
justified by appeal to any kind of positive science, constitutes the corner-stone 
of the positivist framework (Robbins, 1969, pp. 140-1). 
 
Robbins's views on interpersonal comparisons of utility marked an important 
stage in the history of the development of the concept. Since then, theorists have 
been divided over the subject. One can identify three groups broadly defined: 
 
(1) Those who accept Robbins' argument that interpersonal comparisons have 
no scientific basis insist that policy recommendations should be purely 
scientific, and restrict their recommendations accordingly. It is clear that 
this group represents a strict positivist position. 
(2) Those who accept Robbins' arguments, but contrast "positive", scientific 
economics, from which interpersonal comparisons are banished, with 
economic policy, in which science may legitimately be combined with value 
judgements, or ethics. 
(3) Those who believe that interpersonal comparisons have scientific basis 
and are willing to integrate them into a scientific framework. One can argue 
that the third group is closer to the utilitarian position. 
 
First Group 
The first group's views on comparability were very influential during the years 
after the publication of Robbins' critique of the scientific standing of interpersonal 
comparisons. The great influence of this strict positivist approach meant that 
Pigovian welfare economics was left without a solid basis. 
 
Thus, a need for a new approach to welfare economics arose. The basic 
characteristic of the New Welfare economics was the exclusion of interpersonal 
comparisons. The idea was that, by the rejection of comparability, they tried to 
avoid the "normative" or non-scientific characterisation of welfare economics. 
The main representatives of the new approach were Kaldor, Hicks and Lange. 
In order to construct a welfare theory without making interpersonal comparisons, 
Kaldor and Hicks attempted to establish a new welfare criterion. This criterion 
(Kaldor-Hicks criterion) states that the economist can say that a certain policy 
increases the aggregate real income when "it is quite sufficient for him to show 
that, even if all those who suffer as a result are fully compensated for their loss, 
the rest of the community will still be better off than before" (Kaldor, 1939, p. 
550). However, it must be noted that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion avoids comparability 
only if the compensation is actually paid and accepted by the loser as full and 
fair since it is the loser who is the only one capable of assessing the magnitude 
of the loss (economists have pointed out, however, that the Kaldor-Hicks criterion 
still assumes implicit comparability (see, for instance, Koutsoyiannis, 1979, p. 529). 
Lange defines total welfare as a vector which has to be maximised subject to the 
condition that no person's utility is decreased. 
 
The common feature of the new welfare school is the idea of comparability as 
a value judgement. Most of the members criticise Pigovian welfare economics 
because it accepts comparability (see, for instance, Hicks, 1939, p. 697). The main 
problem according to them was the non-scientific character of interpersonal 
comparisons. Lange, for instance, held that the whole problem was the utilitarian 
idea that the total welfare of the community was the sum of individual utilities 
which implies comparability of utilities (Lange, 1942, p. 215). Thus, the positivist 
criticism of utilitarian welfare economics became very strong in the writings of 
the above mentioned theorists. 
 
Social Welfare Functions and Arrow's Theorem 
The idea of social welfare functions represented the attempt to construct 
"meaningful" (in the logical positivist context) welfare theory which will be able 
to give prescriptions in policy questions. The first social welfare function was 
proposed by Bergson who, following the positivist framework, thought that 
Marshall's and Pigou's conception of aggregate welfare involved comparability which 
is a value judgement (Bergson, 1938, p. 310). Bergson believed that, with his social 
welfare function, he would be able to overcome the problem of comparability. More 
specifically, he defines it as a function of the welfare of each member of the 
community, or of the quantities of goods and services consumed by each member. 
In symbols (the function is ordinally defined): 
 
W = W(U1 U2, U3 ... Un) 
 
W = economic welfare, n = individual, and U - individual utility. The idea is 
to maximise the above function, subject to a production function: 
Q = f(K,L) 
 
In his Foundations of Economic Analysis, Samuelson stated a similar social welfare 
function of the general form (it is ordinally defined and z represents all possible 
variables): 
 
W = W(z1 z2, ...) 
 
The above has to be maximised subject to the constraint, the general form of 
which can be written as: 
gi (z1 z2, ...) = 0 
 
Samuelson admits that the exclusion of comparability from the assumptions of 
the welfare function limits the range of welfare economics. However, he points 
out that it can "assure us that there exists a still better point if we are at a point 
on the Possibility function" (Samuelson, 1947, pp. 203-53). 
 
Thus, it seemed that the concept of social welfare can give life again to the 
field of welfare economics. The Kaldor-Hicks criterion and the Bergson-Samuelson 
social welfare function represented the positivist attempt to rebuild welfare 
economics. 
 
However, Arrow's impossibility theorem showed that the concept of social welfare 
function is vulnerable to criticism. More specifically, in 1951, Arrow in his work, 
Social Choice and Individual Values, wrote: 
If we exclude the possibility of interpersonal comparisons of utility, then the only methods of 
passing from individual tastes to social preferences which will be satisfactory and which will 
be defined for a wide range of sets of individual orderings are either imposed or dictatorial 
(Arrow, 1963, p. 59). 
 
The important point was that he showed the impossibility of deriving a nondictatorial 
social welfare function. In essence, Arrow's theorem undermined the 
attempts to construct a positivist welfare economics. The positivist-inspired 
rejection of comparability left us without an acceptable welfare theory, or at least 
limited, to a great extent, the policy suggestions of the positivist oriented 
economists. 
 
The positivist approach towards comparability was dominant in the first decades 
after the Second World War, and thus the position that comparability is a value 
judgement and so not acceptable in economics was shared by the majority of 
economists. However, many economists began to realise the serious limitations 
that the rejection of comparability imposed on matters of policy suggestions. More 
specifically, in the first post-war years, a huge increase of the state sector took 
place in many countries. This meant the introduction of macro policies and of welfare 
policies, like national insurance, in the principal western countries. In particular, 
in the UK the National Health Service and National Insurance Acts were introduced 
in 1946. These measures were the products of the Beveridge report of 1942. 
Analogous measures were taken by other national governments. Moreover, the system 
of progressive taxation became more widespread in a great number of 
countries. It can be said that these measures were based on the ideas of utilitarian 
welfare economics. All of the above measures required that interpersonal 
comparisons are possible. Thus, it was clear that there was an inconsistency 
between the established practice and the rejection of comparability by mainstream 
economics. 
 
The result was that the positivist approach started to lose influence among 
economists and especially among welfare economics theorists. Signs of modification 
of the strict positivist position appeared and this brings us to the second and third 
groups. 
 
Second Group 
Robbins can be seen as a forerunner of this group since he was prepared to accept 
comparability in matters of economic policy given that it was explicitly conceived 
as a value-judgement (non-scientific). Scitovsky was one of the first economists 
to emphasise the difficulties emerging from a strict positivist position and also 
the need for comparability in policy prescriptions. The following quotation from 
his 1951 article is indicative of the approach of the second group: 
Strictly speaking, such an assumption [comparability] is not objective and not scientific. 
Interpersonal comparisons of utility are value judgements but they shall be used for drawing 
advice on economic policy (Scitovsky, 1951, p. 314). 
 
Scitovsky called for the acceptance of comparability even if it is a value judgement. 
He pointed out that many important elements of economics which were established 
as part of the economic theory were themselves value judgements. Scitovsky's 
example was that the preference for prosperity over depression was itself a value 
judgement (Scitovsky, 1951, pp. 317-8). 
 
Similar to the position of the second group are the ideas of Rawls. In particular, 
Rawls doubted the scientific status of interpersonal comparisons, but he accepted 
their value as moral or political principles (Rawls, 1958, p. 191). In his later work, 
A Theory of Justice, Rawls identifies the need to find some objective grounds of 
comparability for questions of social justice. His suggestion is to identify first the 
least advantaged person in the community, and then to see whether a change 
in the basic structure makes him better or worse off. By this method we can 
determine the best situation. Thus: 
 
While qualitative interpersonal comparisons are made in finding the bottom position, for the 
rest ordinal judgements of one representative man suffice (Rawls, 1971, pp. 71-2). 
 
Rawls' basis for comparability is not utilitarian oriented. The above principle which 
is called the difference principle was to give new interest to the issue. Rawls' 
approach was to be used for constructing Rawlsian social welfare functions. 
 
Atkinson and Stiglitz's approach to the issue can also be seen as belonging to 
the second group. More specifically, Atkinson and Stiglitz's views concentrate 
on the connection of comparability with the theory of taxation. In their work they 
admit that the "New Welfare Economics" (the positivist position) does not provide 
sufficient guidance for public policy suggestions and they proceed to accept 
comparability explicitly (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980, p. 352). Apart from the above, 
Atkinson and Stiglitz (in the process of building a taxation theory) use social 
welfare functions despite Arrow's theorem (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980 part B). 
Since Atkinson and Stiglitz's Lectures on Public Economics has been very influential, 
the position of the second group on the issue of comparability would seem to 
have significance among contemporary theorists. 
 
Third Group 
 
The third group's position on comparability can be seen as closer to the utilitarian 
approach, since interpersonal comparisons are basically regarded as scientifically 
sound. Economists whose ideas on comparability belong to this group were mainly 
influenced by Marshall's and Pigou's approach to the issue. Their first step towards 
the reinstatement of comparability was the reintroduction of cardinal utility. We 
have stated that in the first decades of this century cardinal utility started to be 
replaced by ordinal utility (the first attempt was carried out by Pareto). In practice, 
the welfare theorists after Robbins, who rejected comparability, thought of utility 
as an ordinal concept. However, in the 1950s there were signs of a revival of the 
old conception of utility as cardinally measurable. 
 
More specifically, in 1952 in an article entitled "A Cardinal Concept of Welfare", 
Fleming attempted to reintroduce cardinality into welfare economics. Fleming's 
method was to set five ethical postulates which are necessary for establishing 
the cardinality of welfare. These postulates "will suffice to ensure that the welfare 
concept characteristic of that ethical system will be susceptible to fundamental 
measurement" (Fleming, 1952, p. 369). Although Fleming does not explicitly refer 
to the issue of comparability, it is obvious that cardinality facilitates to a great 
extent the conception of interpersonal comparisons as scientific. 
 
The discussion of cardinal welfare continued in the work of Harsanyi. Harsanyi 
finds that Fleming's postulates are value judgements, but that they are perfectly 
acceptable according to common ethical standards. So, he holds that the concept 
of additive cardinal welfare is a logical one. Along with cardinality, Harsanyi accepts 
interpersonal comparisons too. In a statement which echoes Marshall and Pigou, 
Harsanyi holds that: 
In the case of persons with similar preferences and expressive reactions we are fully entitled 
to assume that they derive the same utilities from similar situations (Harsanyi, 1955, p. 317). 
 
After this acceptance of comparability, he refers to the positive-based view of 
the first group, that interpersonal comparisons are value judgements and 
unacceptable for economic policy. In a manner which reflects the spirit of the third 
group, he states that comparability is a factual proposition based on certain principles 
of inductive logic, and it can be objective depending on the extent of the factual 
(psychological) information (Harsanyi, 1955, pp. 320-1). 
 
Robertson's ideas about comparability reflect more explicitly the uneasiness 
of some economists with the inconsistency between theory and practice. Robertson 
emphasises that by cardinal utility and interpersonal comparisons of utility we can 
draw inferences about important matters such as taxation policy (Robertson, 1954, 
p. 38). His main point is that the tools of a measurable utility and of comparability 
can help us proceed with economic problems which are crucial to society. 
 
Little can be viewed as another influential theorist whose ideas on comparability 
belong to the third group. Little rejected the conception of comparability as a value 
judgement and states that interpersonal comparisons rest on observations or 
introspection and therefore they are empirical judgements about the real world 
(Little, 1973, pp. 56,66). 
 
The position of the third group on comparability emerged in the 1950s as a 
reaction to the positivism of the first group. However, apart from the above works 
which were published during that period, the third group's approach can be 
recognised in the writings of subsequent theorists. Sen, for instance, points out 
that his attitude towards interpersonal comparisons "involves neither Pigovian 
precision, nor Robbinsonian rejection" (Sen, 1982, p. 23). He openly condemns 
the idea that comparability should be rejected. In his work (and especially in his 
intersection approach) Sen allows partial interpersonal comparability, which means 
"that utility comparisons may be neither impossible nor — on the other hand 
- terribly exact" (Sen, 1982, p. 22). 
 
Analogous to Sen is Ng's view which can be found in his Welfare Economics. 
Ng admits the practical difficulties of cardinal utility but he holds that individual 
utility is cardinally measurable (Ng, 1979, p. 17). This leads to a similar position 
on comparability, very close to those accepting interpersonal comparison as 
perfectly legitimate: 
Judgements involving interpersonal comparisons of utility are subjective judgements of fact. 
Even though the facts are of a subjective nature, it is very difficult to measure individual 
utilities and to compare them interpersonally with any degree of precision. While such 
difficulties should not be underestimated, they do not make interpersonal comparison value 
judgements (Ng, 1979,p. 15). 
 
Ng's position is close to Harsanyi's factual assumption approach. Ng represents 
the conception of an acceptable but imprecise comparability. 
 
Other advocates of the third group position are even closer to utilitarian 
acceptability. For instance, Jeffrey proposes to use Bentham's normative political 
theory together with a utility concept based on the work of von Neumann and 
Morgenstern. Von Neumann and Morgenstern had made attempts towards a 
numerical concept of utility based on probability theory (von Neumann and 
Morgenstern, 1953, p. 24). According to this view this would lead to a substitution 
of interpersonal comparisons of utilities with the interpersonal comparisons of 
preferences Geffrey, 1971, pp. 647-56). It is clear that Jeffrey attempts to avoid 
the ambiguity of the concept of utility. In its place the more "objective" concept 
of preferences is used. However, it seems that this approach does not have much 
influence. 
 
Simon's view is also closely associated with utilitarianism. Simon holds that 
in order to avoid fruitless metaphysical discussions about utility and interpersonal 
comparisons, economists should choose that proxy or proxies which seem best 
to stand for the underlying concept and are measurable (Simon, 1974, p. 82). 
Analogous to Simon is Hammond's view which sees nothing illegitimate in accepting 
dual comparability: comparability of utility levels and utility differences or both 
(Hammond, 1977). 
 
These, then, were the main representatives of the viewpoints of the three groups 
identified above. Chronologically, up to the beginning of the 1970s the issue of 
comparability was considered by the great majority of economists as settled. 
 
Despite the appearance of works which condemned a strict positivist approach 
to the issue, the norm was that interpersonal comparisons are not scientific and 
that they are not legitimate for economic policy recommendations. However, since 
that period discussions about comparability have appeared again and this was due 
to the increasing influence of the second and third groups' viewpoints. In addition 
to that, however, the established practice of policies which presuppose comparability 
made the limitations of a positivist theoretical approach to the issue quite clear. 
 
The result was that an increasing number of welfare economics theorists seem 
to be sympathetic to some form of acceptance of comparability (second and third 
groups). The important implication of this is that recently the strict positivist 
position (First group) has started to be undermined. However, it must be noted 
that the positivist viewpoint is still very strong among non-specialists. 
 
Conclusion 
The starting-point of this article was the inconsistency between the established 
practice of accepting comparability in many cases of economic policy and the 
theoretical rejection of interpersonal comparisons by the majority of economists. 
In particular, it was noted that a great number of economists conceive interpersonal 
comparisons as a value judgement and thus non-scientific, On the other hand it 
was observed that comparability is implicitly accepted in many cases as for instance 
in progressive taxation, national insurance policies and in the very notion of 
aggregate real income as a welfare indicator. 
 
This inconsistency was explained with a historical discussion of the development 
of the different viewpoints on the issue. This enabled an identification of two broadly 
defined approaches: the utilitarian one (cardinality and acceptance of comparability) 
and the positivist one (ordinal utility and rejection of comparability) as unscientific. 
After Robbins the approaches to the issue became more refined. In particular, 
three broadly defined groups were identified. The first group was made up by 
those who thought of comparability as a value judgement and unacceptable for 
economic policy recommendations. This group can be termed "positivist" since 
it can be seen as a continuation of the positivist tradition of Pareto. The second 
group was composed of those who agreed with the positivists on the normative 
nature of comparability but accepted it was a basis for economic policy. Finally, 
advocates of the third group thought of comparability as part of a scientific 
economics. Clearly this group is close to the utilitarian approach to the issue seen 
in the first part of the article. 
 
The above enabled the observation that, despite the numerous attempts by 
positivist oriented economists to dismiss interpersonal comparisons as unscientific, 
a strong tendency by many economists to ignore the positivist limitations exists. 
Thus, although positivism is still a dominant methodological position and it is 
followed in other sub-fields (i.e. consumer theory), the historical experience points 
to the difficulty of applying positivist methodology to the issue of comparability. 
All these indicate that the problem of interpersonal comparisons has important 
implications for the positivist methodology: one might question the validity of a 
methodology which cannot be applied universally. A general assessment of this 
point, however, is beyond the scope of this article. 
 
Nevertheless, one can draw some observations regarding the issue of positive-
normative distinction which is an important part of the positivist approach. More 
specifically, given the above, one might adopt Myrdal's complete denial of the 
possibility of such distinction in economics or Hutchison's moderate thesis (see 
Myrdal, 1953; Hutchison, 1964). However, the case of interpersonal comparisons 
is a clear example where the positivist methodology, and especially the positive-
normative distinction, is highly problematic. Thus, it can be maintained that the 
inconsistency between the established practice of implicitly accepting comparability 
and its explicit theoretical rejection is due to the inappropriateness of the positivist 
approach in the social context. 
 
The recent trend towards a compromise has not been able to introduce a 
satisfactory solution, and comparability remains a highly problematic issue. It seems 
that the only way towards a solution would be to abandon fully and explicitly the 
positivist principles at least in matters related to the collective aspects of economics. 
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